Amy Handlin and John McKeon are sponsoring an anti-consumer bill that would change the business landscape in New Jersey.
A key provision of the new New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act would exempt out of state transactions. This means the following: if someone in New Jersey commits consumer fraud upon a non-resident (living in NY, PA or CT) there are no consequences.
“a. apply only to transactions that take place in the State”
Car Salesmen and Dealerships to be Protected with Proposed Changes in Consumer Fraud Act.
Amy Handlin and Jack McKeon have sponsored and introduced ANTI-CONSUMER legislation to reduce consumer rights and protect car dealerships.
The changes in the Consumer Fraud Act would exempt or limit liability against businesses that are already regulated, such as car dealerships. It would also limit liability for consumers who consummate out-of-state transactions. This arguably contradicts other legislation that has been introduced to increase liability for those committing consumer fraud.
CHANGES IN THE NEW JERSEY CONSUMER FRAUD ACT TO PROTECT CAR SALESMAN
Amy Handlin is the co-sponsor on this bill to protect car salesman
John McKeon is the primary Sponsor on this bill to protect car salesmen.
The New Jersey court system has, for civil courts, three separate levels. The most basic and lowest level in the New Jersey court system is known as Small Claims. In Small Claims, you may sue a defendant or counterclaim against a plaintiff for up $3,000. Initially, in this type of court case, you must go to the county in which the defendant resides and file a claim through the court. You will fill out the appropriate forms and the court sends the notice to the defendant and gives you a court date. The defendant is not required to file an answer, but if they wish to do so, they might with a counterclaim. The court date occurs within 30 to 45 days from the filing of the lawsuit.
The next level for the New Jersey is known as the Special Civil Part Law Division. Claims in this court range up to $15,000 as a maximum. However, not counted within the cap is a claim for attorney’s fees and costs under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act. Presumptively, this would also apply to warranty claims as well. In this matter, as a defendant, you are required to file an answer as well as a counterclaim, so you are unable to sit back and do nothing and await a court date. In this action, discovery is also permitted under the court rules; however, not in depositions. If you want a deposition, you must make an application to the court to request a deposition of the adversary. Written discovery is permitted, such as interrogatories and demand for documents, and subpoenas are permitted to be issued. Offer of judgment may not be used in the Special Civil Part or the Law Division. Motion practice varies by county, but under the theory, you might file a motion for the defendant’s failure to provide discovery and if this is opposed, the court will list it for oral argument. However, please check with the specific county in which you have filed to check this procedure with the specific court.
The issue is the enforceability of a forum selection clause.
The defendant has failed to demonstrate that the reverse side of an unsigned invoice constitutes all of the terms and conditions of the contract for the plaintiff’s purchase of the subject engines. It is too early in the litigation to make this determination. When the contract terms are ambiguous and the parties dispute their meaning, construction of the contract and application of any evidence submitted to prove the surrounding circumstances are for the jury. See State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Anderson, 70 N.J. Super. 520 524 (App. Div. 1961).
A review of the “invoice” demonstrates that the purchase price is on the front of the document and various terms are on the rear of the document. There is no indication that the plaintiff signed, was asked to sign, or actually was required to sign this invoice. There is no proof that the plaintiff even reviewed the rear of the invoice. There is no indication by the terms of the conditions at the rear the contract that by accepting delivery of the boat the plaintiff accepts all of the terms and conditions of the agreement. Therefore, this matter is not ripe for summary judgment at this time because there is potentially factual issue as to whether or not the reverse side of the “invoice” is determinative of the nature and extent of the relationship between the parties, whether or not there was an ongoing relationship between the parties prior to the date of the purchase, and whether or not the terms and conditions at the rear of the contract were intended to be a part of the transaction.
Thus, if a seller of an automobile says that the vehicle has not been in an accident, when in fact it has been in an accident, that is an affirmative misrepresentation of fact which is false and inherently has the capacity to mislead a potential purchaser of the vehicle. This should be an actionable representation contemplated under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, for which the plaintiff would be entitled to damages if a case was proved. There are other ways to prove a consumer fraud under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act where good faith might be a defense. As an example, if a plaintiff is claiming a material omission of fact, the plaintiff would be required to prove intent to pursue a claim under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act. However, when the plaintiff is alleging an affirmative misrepresentation of fact, good faith is not a defense. As an example, if a dealer were to state that a vehicle was not in an accident and in fact was in an accident, even though they were relying upon a CARFAX or other industry accepted databases or documentation, they would not have a valid defense under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act.
As an example, there is a case under New Jersey law called Cuesta v. Classic Car. In this specific case, the seller of an automobile sold a vehicle with an inappropriate or improper odometer reading. The Court held that the improper odometer reading created a ‘misrepresentation of fact’ which was actionable under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act. The dealer claimed they were unaware of this rollback; however, this is not deemed a valid defense. This is consistent with the liberal interpretation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act and the decision by the legislature to place the burden on a business to make sure that the product that they sell is in fact consistent with any representations set forth by the selling dealership or business.
A consumer should be able to rely upon the representations from the business since they are the experts in the field in which the consumer is dealing. It is an entirely separate post to quantify the amount of loss where the appropriate procedure or guidelines for pursuing a claim for consumer fraud under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act. However, this post just demonstrates types of claims which can be sued and the obligations upon a business when selling a vehicle product or other consumer goods.
Appearance Package, Wheel Well Molding, Door Edge Guards
Some dealerships use the sale or attempted sale of door edge guards, wheel well molding or pin striping, commonly known as appearance packages, to increase the costs of the vehicles. Frequently, these pre-delivery services are not included anywhere in the buyer’s order but only on a price addendum placed on the automobile. New Jersey law is relatively straightforward and requires a consumer to sign off and acknowledge the purchase of any pre-delivery services on the sale of an automobile. The dealership uses the guise of these expensive products, which increase the “sticker” price of a vehicle. When the customer sits downs and looks at all the paperwork, it is not apparent that these items are included in the price anywhere. This is the intention behind the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act and the associated Administrative Code regulations requiring consumers to acknowledge purchase of pre-delivery services. Even if these were considered aftermarket items or different types of products, it would still be appropriate for the dealer to disclose the nature and extent of these products, any warranties that were associated with these products, and the costs thereof. The best advice would be to be very careful in the injunction of negotiating a purchase price on a new vehicle and demand for an itemization of any and all products and/or services that you are acquiring or think you are acquiring as part of the automobile purchase. The dealership is required to disclose this to you fully and honestly and the best way to do this would be to bring a piece of paper where the dealership would sign off on the specific products which you are purchasing. This would forego any potential confusion and document exactly what you are and are not purchasing.
DAMAGED AND FRAME-DAMAGED CARS
It is a common question that is asked frequently: does a seller of a motor vehicle or an automobile have the obligation to disclose that the vehicle was damaged even slightly, less than frame damage? Is there a separate obligation based on the nature and extent of the damage? Is it relevant that there was frame damage? The New Jersey law in the subject is mostly a matter of common sense. If the seller of an automobile or vehicle knows that a vehicle was damaged, he has the obligation to make material disclosures to the person to whom he is selling the car if he thinks that the disclosure of the information would make a difference in the purchasing decision. This is what makes a material disclosure relevant.
There are certain exceptions to this rule for the disclosure of damages on damaged cars where the legislator has promulgated or passed various laws requiring certain disclosures. As an example, New Jersey law requires disclosure of advertised automobiles where there is damage in excess of $1,000. This number varies by state. Nonetheless, the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act has taken the more ethical approach and applied it to the sale of goods. The law in the State of New Jersey is no longer buyer beware but rather seller beware. Therefore, the seller of an automobile has the obligation to make sure that all representations pertaining to the sale of specific automobile are correct. As an example, if the seller tells a buyer that a vehicle has not been damaged, has not been in an accident, is in good shape or makes certain representation as to the condition of the vehicle, he has an obligation to make sure that this representation is true and accurate. The New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act does not have any intent requirement for affirmative misrepresentations. This means that if a seller of an automobile says the vehicle has not been damaged or has not been in an accident and ultimately it turns out that the vehicle was in an accident despite the seller of the automobile not being aware of same, there is liability under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act which applies triple damages, attorney fees and costs.
WAIVER OF CONSUMER FRAUD CLAIMS AND CONSUMER FRAUD
The litigation in this case arises out of the plaintiff’s allegations that the defendant committed fraud and consumer fraud with regard to the performance of a home improvement contract. See Cox v. Sears, 92 N.J. 1 (1994). The defendant now relies upon arbitration clause and move to have the case dismissed. The arbitration clause provides the following:
Any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract at the option of Care Temp may be submitted to binding arbitration with the American Arbitration Association and judgment on award may be entered in any amount entered in any court or company jurisdiction The arbitration clause as written is unenforceable under New Jersey law as promulgated by the New Jersey Supreme Court. In Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics and Gynecology Associates, 168 N.J. 124 (2001), the court refused to enforce an arbitration agreement because the arbitration agreement failed to specifically include a waiver of statutory rights. The Supreme Court held that without the specific waiver of statutory rights, the agreement could not be said to encompass those statutory rights in the context of an arbitration clause. In Garfinkel, the court refused to force the plaintiff to arbitrate their statutory law against discrimination claims because the arbitration agreement specifically failed to include a waiver of statutory rights.
Under the relevant due process inquiry, the forum state’s exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable, which is measured by the “minimal contacts” doctrine, a threshold requirement for specific personal jurisdiction. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1238, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283, 1296 (1958); International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945); Waste Management, supra, 138 N.J. at 119-20, 649 A.2d 379; Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 322, 558 A.2d 1252. Minimal contacts requires “that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Hanson, supra, 357 U.S. at 253, 78 S.Ct. at 1240, 2 L.Ed.2d at 1298. Under a specific jurisdiction analysis, the minimum contacts inquiry must focus on “the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2579, 53 L.Ed.2d 683, 698 (1977); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 323, 558 A.2d 1252.
In applying the “minimum contacts” test, we focus on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. The “minimum contacts” requirement is satisfied so long as the contacts resulted from the defendant’s purposeful conduct and not the unilateral activities of the plaintiff. This “purposeful availment” requirement ensures that a defendant will not be hauled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts. The question is whether the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being hauled into court there. Lebel v. Everglades Marina, Inc., 115 N.J. 317, 323-24, 558 A.2d 1252 (1989)
Both the Appellate Division and the New Jersey Supreme Court have held that the seller of retail goods in another state is subject to the jurisdiction of the State of New Jersey. The Supreme Court specifically held in Lebel v. Everglades Marina, Inc., 115 N.J. 317 (1989) that, “In comparison, the marketer of a big ticket luxury item that accomplishes the sale by solicitation of out-of-state buyer in the buyer’s state can fairly be expected to contemplate that a breach of contract will expose it to a suit in the forum of the buyer. We thus find this does not offend our notions of substantial justice and fair play to ask the seller of this special order, Luxury Vessel, to account for its negotiations of the transaction in a New Jersey court.”
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